Why Animal Suffering Matters
I’ve just finished reading Andrew Linzey’s latest book “Why Animal Suffering Matters: Philosophy, Theology, and Practical Ethics”.
General impressions first. Christians who believe “the earth is the LORD’s and all that is in it” (Psa. 24) will wrestle with how to rightly represent Him as image bearers; how, as new creations in Christ, we reflect Christ’s lordship over us in our lordship over that which we’ve been given dominion. Thinking Christians will want reasoned arguments and will find them here. If you’re a Christian and you are new to the topic theologically, if you’re reading this and thinking something like, “God put them here for our use”, then I’d start with any of the books on the Resources page. If you want to investigate the philosophical and ethical standpoints too then this book will serve you well.
I am particularly grateful for the format of the book. Rational arguments laid out in clear style. Counter-points addressed at every turn. Not since Matthew Scully’s Dominion have I felt like such a reasoned and precise case has been made for the serious, thoughtful consideration of animals and against the positions of the powers allied against them. Linzey’s latest book furthers that project and condenses the case. He notes in the introduction that the text is aimed at students in high school and undergraduate classes that consider such topics as animal welfare, animal rights, human-animal studies, animal ethics, animals and philosophy, animals an religion, animal law, and even animal theology at the university level (6). It’s laid out like a textbook with summary points at the end of the sections and generous notes for digging deeper. For anyone interested in these topics at this level it is an easy and satisfying read. You know what to do.
I especially enjoyed the way in which the author lays out six of the most common arguments against the moral relevancy of animal suffering and shows that these arguments actually imply precisely the opposite conclusion; they make a stronger case for the moral relevance of animal suffering rather than weaker. (40-42)
The six most common premises and basics (my own interpretation unless otherwise noted) of the alternative stance:
1) animals are naturally slaves (via Aristotle and Aquinas) … since when does power provide its own self-justification, especially for Christians? might makes right? that’s Nietzsche not Jesus.
2) animals are non-rational beings … this only matters if lack of rationality can be proven to decrease suffering, and it is completely plausible that non-comprehension of pain and anxiety and stress and the situations that cause them lead to increased suffering in animals, as well as humans. take babies for example … they don’t yet understand what’s causing their pains and fears, do they therefore suffer less or more than an adult who can? the first step to managing your stress, anxiety, and pain is understanding what’s causing it … if animals don’t have that they’re short the most important tool we use to lessen our own suffering.
3) animals are linguistically deficient … so what? pain occurs at a pre-verbal level in humans … if I put a hot iron to your face you don’t experience that moment in language, you just experience pain and horror … even if they don’t have semantics like we do that doesn’t mean that they don’t suffer in their own ways. how about this study that shows one way in which we use language to lessen the experience of pain. if we use it to lessen pain and animals don’t have that ability then what?
4) animals are not moral agents … that is the most twisted argument that I ever see being made … we are moral agents and it isn’t about the victim it’s about us and how we behave, surely our morality isn’t limited to those beings who can be expected to reciprocate? That seems a lot like the notion of do ut des … giving to get ... that whole notion strikes me as selfish (cf. Luke 12-13, not to mention the ways God gives to us and yet we can’t really “give” anything in return) If we are the morally superior beings we claim to be then it would seem that we should act towards lesser creatures (whether we consider them to be of ‘our own family/tribe/race/kind’ or not) from that morality, as Christ did and does for us, … to suspend it is to deny the principle we begin with.
5) animals are soulless … (if you assume this to be true, scholars differ) “beings that will not be recompensed in another world for their suffering in this one logically deserve more, not less, moral solicitude”. See also:
But the Torah does more than acknowledge physical life, briefly describing also its inception. As a result of God’s creative activity, both animals and people are “living creatures.” In this sense, all of animate nature is on similar standing. While most translations imply that Gen 2:7 is in some way different from 1:20, 24, the Heb. is the same in each instance (chayya nephesh). What separates human beings from the animal world is not that they are living souls rather than living creatures, but that they have been created “in the image of God.” ~New International Dictionary Of Old Testament Theology and Exegesis, “chayya”
6) animals are devoid of the divine image … “if a Christological understanding of power is engaged, human power over animals means responsibility, even service”. So it seems a good bit rests on agreeing to what “image of God” means. Linzey addresses this specifically as well elsewhere in this book.
